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Abstract
Decentralised cloud computing platforms enable individuals
to offer and rent resources in a peer-to-peer fashion. They
must assign resources from multiple sellers to multiple buyers
and derive prices that match the interests and capacities of
both parties. The assignment process must be decentralised,
fair and transparent, but also protect the privacy of buyers.
We present PASTRAMI, a decentralised platform enabling
trustworthy assignments of items and prices between a large
number of sellers and bidders, through the support of multi-
item auctions. PASTRAMI uses threshold blind signatures
and commitment schemes to provide strong privacy guar-
antees while making bidders accountable. It leverages the
Ethereum blockchain for auditability, combining efficient
off-chain computations with novel, on-chain proofs of misbe-
haviour. Our evaluation of PASTRAMI using Filecoin work-
loads show its ability to efficiently produce trustworthy as-
signments between thousands of buyers and sellers.
1 Introduction
Sharing economy systems allow individuals to rent or “share”
their resources to other individuals in a peer-to-peer fashion.
Multiple platforms already implement this concept towards a
decentralised form of cloud computing. They allow renting
the machines of other users to run large-scale computations
(e.g. Golem [50], iExec [1], Pando [36] or SONM [2]) or for
storing data (e.g. Storj [35] or Filecoin [34]). These platforms
often build on blockchains as a global source of trust and
as an enabler of decentralised payments. For instance, the
decentralised file storage platform Filecoin [34] encrypts and
scatters end-users’ files fragments across multiple storage
machines and rewards them with periodic token payments.
One of the main challenges faced by sharing economy
platforms is the difficulty of setting up fair allocations and
prices between large numbers of sellers and buyers of goods
or services (items in the rest of this paper). They need to
set up decentralised mechanisms to globally decide on the
assignment of items from sellers to buyers, and the prices
that apply to the transactions. The interests of buyers and
sellers are, indeed, in conflict: A buyer wishes to buy an ad-
equate item at a minimal price, while a seller wants to sell
its item(s) at the highest possible price. Direct negotiations
between the two parties, as used currently in Filecoin [34],
have poor scalability: Each buyer may have to individually
contact and negotiate with an increasing number of storage
nodes as competition for items increases. Furthermore, direct
negotiation does not provide transparency and cannot guaran-
tee any fairness: there are no guarantees that a seller or buyer
settles the most interesting of all possible deals.
Multi-item auctions are a sound basis for the assignment of
items and prices in decentralised exchange platforms. They al-
low buyers, or bidders, to announce the price they are willing
to pay for an item (their valuation) across many items from
multiple sellers. Valuations may be for a specific item or for
any one of the items that satisfy a number of constraints. We
denote the latter case as a general bid. We present an example
in Figure 1, inspired by Filecoin: Bidder 1 is willing to pay up
to 40 $ for a node with at least 50 GB of storage space, while
bidder 5 specifically bids for the three available storage nodes.
Based on these specific and general bids, a multi-item auction
algorithm can derive an assignment (e.g., bidder 2 is assigned
node 2) and prices for the transactions (e.g., bidder 1 has to
pay 30 $, less than the announced 40 $). The assignment of
items and prices depend on a global measure of goodness that
is specific to the multi-item auction algorithm used. In this
example, resources are assigned to bidders who “value them”
Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 4
Node 1: 60GB Node 2: 25GB Node 3: 15GB
Bidder 5
Node 1 15$
Node 2 13$
Node 3 10$
Node 1 30$
Node 2 10$
Node 3 5$
>50GB
40$
>20GB 
20$
>20GB 
15$
30$ 15$ 5$ Multi-item
 auction
Figure 1. Example of general (bidders 1–3) and specific (bidders 4 & 5) bids
for multiple items in the context of a decentralised storage cloud, and of the
assignment of items and prices decided by a multi-item auction algorithm.
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the most while deciding on a price following rules of supply
and demand.
The pricing mechanism is a critical component of an ex-
change platform and all participants should be convinced of
its correctness. A single malicious auction operator could
easily influence the assignment to maximise its own gain. At
the same time, verification should not require all participants
to reproduce the entire computation.
Transparency and verification come, however, in apparent
tension with the need to preserve the privacy of auctions
participants. First, sealed-bid auctions require to keep bids
private until all of them are submitted. This prevents late
bidders from taking advantage from the already revealed in-
formation [27]. Second, it is important to keep bidders iden-
tity private. For instance, revealing that a company recently
rented significant amounts of storage may expose company’s
operation details to its competitors.
Finally, it is necessary to compute auction results in an
efficient and scalable manner. Auction algorithms experience
exponential increase in execution time and require storing
significant volumes of data with increasing size of the input
parameters. In sharing economy systems, potentially thou-
sands of buyers must be assigned to sellers on a regular basis.
Decentralised auctions have been realised previously using
Secure Multi-Party Computations (MPC) [3, 8]. MPC-based
auctions provide strong privacy and correctness guarantees,
but introduce significant computational overhead and can be
executed only between a limited number of parties. It means
that the computations have to be performed by a small number
of actors that must be trusted by all of the auction participants,
something that is difficult to realise in practice.
Blockchain platforms with support for executable smart
contracts are an appealing solution for building auditable
auctions, thanks to the immutability of their decentralised
ledger [7, 22, 24]. However, direct auction execution using a
smart contract impairs privacy and is at odds with scalability:
The costly assignment calculation has to be repeated by all
miners, leading to large overheads. General platforms for
verifiable computations such as Truebit [49] or Arbitrum [29]
reduce the overhead, but require multiple verifiers to repeat
full programs and do not offer sufficient privacy protection.
While many specific auctions systems try to increase bidders
privacy or offload heavy computations off-chain, they require
a trusted third party [7], secure hardware [55] or involve
significant computational overhead [22].
Contributions. We present the design and evaluation of PAS-
TRAMI, a framework for private, secure and efficient multi-
item auctions. PASTRAMI leverages the Vicrey-Dutch algo-
rithm (VDA) [40, 41] to determine an assignment between
bidders and items and derive optimal prices1, and can be eas-
ily adapted to support other forms of auctions. PASTRAMI
1Vickrey-Dutch Auctions are multi-item, sealed-bid auctions that maximise
a measure of social welfare for their assignments (i.e., sum of the differences
extends VDA with support for general bids: Bidders can pro-
vide a valuation for any item whose description matches a
set of predicates. General bids are automatically transformed
in a number of per-item bids, as manipulated by the VDA
algorithm.
PASTRAMI leverages the Ethereum blockchain for trans-
parency, enabling any party to audit and if necessary invali-
date the outcome of an auction. To ensure that bidders only
provide faithful valuations, PASTRAMI binds bids to the
Ethereum cryptocurrency: Buyers cannot bid higher than the
amount of money submitted to a deposit. Funds are automati-
cally deducted from their accounts if they acquire an item.
PASTRAMI protects privacy by hiding submitted bids as
well as the identity of bidders using threshold blind signatures.
In contrast with related work, PASTRAMI does not rely on
a single trusted third party, but rather on a set of multiple,
decentralised authorities. Each user can define their own set
of trusted parties and is protected from a definable subset of
authorities becoming malicious.
High efficiency in PASTRAMI results from two key design
choices. First, we run the heavy VDA computation off-chain
and allow any node to submit an auction solution in the form
of an assignment between items and bidders and a price vector.
Second, to avoid re-running auctions or perform costly on-
chain verification we develop simple verification techniques
in the form of proofs of misbehaviour. Users can generate
such proofs without re-running the VDA algorithm, and for
a fraction of its computational cost. The PASTRAMI smart
contract can check the validity of these proofs and discard
faulty assignments. Both providers of solutions and submit-
ters of proofs of misbehaviour are held accountable for their
actions by linking virtuous and malicious behaviours with
monetary rewards and penalties.
We implement PASTRAMI and deploy it over Ethereum,
using workloads derived from Filecoin. PASTRAMI ensures
correctness, protects bidder’s privacy and scale to large of
numbers bidders and items. Our evaluation shows the ability
to derive optimal assignments between 10,000 users and 100
Filecoin storage nodes with less than 8 seconds of CPU time
on a regular laptop and enable auditing the result in less than
half a second. The comparison with Verifiable Sealed-bid
Auctions [22] shows 4 orders of magnitude lower execution
time, 2.5x reduction in contract deployment costs, and up to
an 8x reduction in cost per bidder.
Outline. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents our system, its adversary model, and details
our objectives. Section 3 presents an overview of PASTRAMI,
and Section 4 discusses background. We describe our design
divided into a preparation phase and an execution phase in
Sections 5 and 6. We provide a discussion and a security
analysis in Section 7, and present our evaluation results in
between initial bids and paid prices). VDA assigns the price of the second
highest bid to each item, incentivising truthful valuations.
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Section 8. We finally cover related work in Section 9 and
conclude in Section 10.
2 PASTRAMI Design Goals
We start by defining our system model, notations and assump-
tions. We follow up by specifying our target properties for cor-
rectness, but also privacy and ease of deployment. These prop-
erties are summarised in Table 1. We describe system com-
ponents using Filecoin as a running example. However, our
platform can be used in any decentralised system requiring
an assignment between buyers and sellers [1, 2, 35, 36, 50].
2.1 System Model
We consider the following actors:
• Bidders are users wishing to buy goods or services,
denoted by the generic term item, e.g., Filecoin end-
users willing to store their files;
• Sellers are users offering such items, e.g., Filecoin stor-
age nodes;
• A set of authorities jointly issues credentials allowing
bidders to anonymously participate in auctions. For in-
stance, in Filecoin this role can be taken by blockchain
validators or a distinctive set of entities trusted by sys-
tem participants.
We emphasise that none of the authorities is trusted indi-
vidually by the users. Instead, users trust a set of authorities
as a whole similarly to an honest majority in blockchains or
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols [15].
PASTRAMI accepts item description submitted by sellers
and sealed-bids commitments (bids) expressed by bidders.
A bid expresses a valuation, i.e., the maximal price that the
bidder is willing to pay for an item. Each bid is backed by a
deposit of that valuation. This deposit is expressed in coins
that cannot be double-spent [30] and is guaranteed by the
authorities. Based on the set of all bids, PASTRAMI outputs
a price vector and an assignment between bidders and items.
This assignment must be the output of a globally-known
algorithm. PASTRAMI employs the Vickrey-Dutch multi-
item auction algorithm, but can be adapted to different types
of single-item, multi-item and even combinatorial auctions.
In the example of Filecoin, storage nodes (sellers) advertise
their capacities (i.e., storage space, available bandwidth, lease
duration) together with a minimum price they are willing to
accept. End-users (buyers) submit their requirements and a
maximum amount they are willing to pay (i.e., “I am willing to
pay 10 tokens for a month of using a 80 GB, high-bandwidth
storage node”). PASTRAMI automatically allocates end-users
to the most suitable storage nodes and derives prices following
rules of supply and demand.
2.2 Notations and Assumptions
Cryptographic assumptions. PASTRAMI inherits the same
cryptographic assumptions as its underlying BLS blind signa-
ture scheme we present in Section 4, which requires groups
(G1,G2,GT ) of prime order p with a bilinear map e : G1 ×
G2 → GT and satisfying (i) Bilinearity, (ii) Non-degeneracy,
and (iii) Efficiency. PASTRAMI uses type-3 pairings because
of their efficiency [25]; and thus relies on the XDH assump-
tion which implies the difficulty of the Computational co-
Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem in G1 and G2, and the
difficulty of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem
in G1 [11].
Threshold assumptions. PASTRAMI assumes that at least
t-out-of-n authorities are honest and available at all time (with
t > n/2). If more than t authorities collude, they can forge
signatures or stall the system, but cannot break unlinkability
and de-anonymize users.
Communication assumptions. The PASTRAMI actors in-
teract through the direct exchange of messages as well as
through a blockchain supporting executable smart contracts.
Our implementation uses Ethereum [13]. We assume the fol-
lowing about communications:
• Authorities: PASTRAMI authorities are collectively re-
sponsible for issuing signatures to bidders. They do not
need to communicate with each other in order to issue
these signatures. However, practical implementations of
threshold signature schemes initially require either using
the distributed key generation protocol of Kate et al. [31],
which requires (i) weak synchrony for liveness (but not for
safety), and (ii) at most one third of dishonest authorities; or
using the distributed key generation protocol of Gennaro et
al. [26] which requires (i) synchrony, and (ii) an honest
majority. Key generation is, however, run only once (or
rarely) and resulting keys can be used in multiple auctions.
• Authorities-Users: Users wait for t-out-of-n replies (in
any order of arrival) and aggregate them into a consoli-
dated signature; thus PASTRAMI implicitly assumes an
asynchronous setting between users and authorities.
• Bidders-Sellers: Bidders do not interact or trust each other.
The same applies to sellers. A bidders and a seller need
only communicate directly to implement a deal, after an
auction final assignment is available.
2.3 Target Properties for PASTRAMI
PASTRAMI aims at providing the following properties:
Auctions’ economics. PASTRAMI assigns resources to the
bidders that value them the most guaranteeing Efficiency.
In addition, PASTRAMI guarantees Incentive Compatibility
meaning that bidders and sellers benefit from revealing their
true valuations and can only lose by artificially increasing
or decreasing those valuations. This property is linked to
Individual Rationality, which ensures that both bidders and
3
Economic Properties
Efficiency bidders get items they value the most
Incentive Compatibility bidders benefit from revealing their bids
Individual Rationality bidders and sellers benefit from participation
Budget Balance derived prices exceed minimum prices
Correctness
Bids Binding bids cannot be changed once committed
Public Auditability participants are able to verify its correctness
Fairness users deviating from the protocol are penalised
Privacy
Hidden Minimum Price minimum prices are private until the end of the auction
Bidders Privacy Bidders are unlinkable to their bids
Bids Privacy Bids are private until the end of the auction
Deployment
Non-Interactivity bidders are not required to stay online
Openness anyone can become a bidder or a seller
Distributed authority PASTRAMI does not rely on a single trusted party
Scalability support for large number of items and bidders
Table 1. Target properties of PASTRAMI.
sellers are incentivised to participate in the auctions. Finally,
it targets Budget Balance by making sure that the payments
submitted cover sellers’ compensations (i.e., derived prices
are superior to minimum prices submitted by sellers).
Correctness. PASTRAMI verifies that auction assignment
are computed correctly and that all participants follow the
protocol. To avoid malicious manipulation, bidders cannot
change their bids once they are committed (Bids Binding).
Furthermore, anyone can verify the correct execution of any
auction by inspecting the public information available on the
ledger (Public Auditability). PASTRAMI achieves Fairness
by making sure that bidders are financially penalised if they
deviate from the protocol, but cannot be financially penalised
if they follow it correctly.
Privacy. PASTRAMI aims to only disclose the minimum
amount of information required to verify the correctness of
the auction. The minimum prices submitted by sellers are kept
private from the bidders until the end of the auction (Hidden
Minimum Price); and bids submitted to the system are kept
private until the end of the auction (Bids Privacy). Those two
properties ensure that bidders submit their bids without any
knowledge of what other do, preventing price manipulation
(i.e., submitting bids slightly above the minimum price or the
current highest bid). PASTRAMI also keeps bidders anony-
mous, ensuring that bidders are unlinkable to their bids and
that the identity of the assigned bidder is revealed only to the
seller at the end of the auction.
Deployment. The process of submitting items, bids and cal-
culating a result can take a significant amount of time. Many
participants may not be able to stay connected during the
entire duration of an auction. To facilitate large scale deploy-
ments and support large number of users, bidders are not re-
quired to interact with each other providing Non-Interactivity.
Furthermore, PASTRAMI targets Openness, meaning that
anyone can act as bidder or seller and the system is resilient
to censorship. Our platform support the Distributed Authority
property and does not rely on a single trusted 3rd party at
any point. Finally, PASTRAMI achieves high Scalability and
supports large number of users and items while maintaining
low overall cost of running auctions for the platform and its
participant.
3 PASTRAMI Overview
Figure 2 presents an overview of PASTRAMI. An auction
is divided in two subsequent phases, a preparation phase
(steps 1 to 5) and an execution phase (steps 6 and 7).
Preparation phase. A set of distributed authorities starts by
publishing their aggregated verification key along with any
associated parameters, and sets up a smart contract on the
blockchain (step 1). In order to create privacy-preserving
accounts, bidders contact this smart contract and pay a max-
imum amount they are willing to bid as a deposit (step 2).
The authorities observe the smart contract, and generate cryp-
tographic material required by bidders to participate in the
auction. Bidders then contact each authority, retrieve parts
of the material and combine these parts locally into crypto-
graphic credentials (step 3). This credentials allow bidders
to participate in auctions while guaranteeing strong privacy
and ensuring that bidders are backed by a deposit. Bids re-
main unlinkable to bidders’s real identities or to cryptographic
material issued by the authorities.
An auction begins with sellers submitting descriptions of
their items/services to PASTRAMI. To guarantee that their
activities are profitable, sellers can specify a hidden minimum
price for which they are willing to trade their items, and are
guaranteed that the users assigned during the auction have
bid for at least that price (step 4).
In step 5, bidders submit their sealed bids to the smart con-
tracts using their credentials. Bidders can submit two types of
bids. Regular bids express the interest of the bidder for a spe-
cific item, in a form of a price valuation. General bids allow,
on the other hand, bidders to specify their interest in any one
of the items satisfying some constraints. Auction algorithms
only support single-item evaluation, henceforth PASTRAMI
automatically derives a vector of single-item valuations for
all items matching the constraints set in a general bid. Once
all the information is submitted to the blockchain, bids2 and
minimum prices are revealed.
Execution phase. Instead of performing costly assignment
calculations on-chain, the smart contract allows a dedicated
node3 to use the information stored on the blockchain to
perform computations off-chain and submit a solution to the
platform (step 6). The calculation of a solution off-chain does
not suffer from the overhead associated with distributed and
privacy-preserving solutions such as MPC (Section 9). A
2The revealed bids are unlinkable to bidders who expressed them.
3We use a dedicated node for simplicity. In practice, any node can calculate
a solution and submit it to the chain.
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Figure 2. PASTRAMI overview.
solution contains an assignment between sellers and bidders
and derived prices for each of the assigned items. A score is
associated to this assignment, representing the social welfare,
a measure of the quality of the compromise between buyers
and sellers’ interests.
Once submitted, the solution can be contested within a
specified amount of time. Any user, bidder or seller, may
verify the solution off-chain and submit a proof of misbe-
haviour (step 7). PASTRAMI uses lightweight verification
that is much faster the recomputing the auction result. The
smart contract can efficiently test the validity of each proof of
misbehaviour and reject the contested solution. Alternatively,
if no valid proof of misbehaviour is received by the end of
the time period, the solution is marked as final. Bidders can
contact their corresponding sellers, prove their identity and
claim acquired items.
In the next sections, we start by detailing the background
constructions used by PASTRAMI, followed by the details of
the preparation and execution phases.
4 Background
Smart Contracts on Blockchains. The concept of a blockchain
was introduced by Bitcoin [43] as a decentralised, append-
only ledger that provides a global ordering of financial transac-
tions, to prevent funds being spent twice (the double-spending
attack).
Blockchain platforms such as Ethereum [13] provide script
languages to allow users to execute more complex programs
on the blockchain, called smart contracts. Executing a trans-
action calling a method of an Ethereum smart contract has
an associated gas cost that is proportional to the number of
instructions and the amount of storage required by the trans-
action. The monetary value of gas varies depending on the
load on the network, and is paid for using Ether, Ethereum’s
built-in currency.
PASTRAMI leverages the high-integrity data structure pro-
vided by a blockchain, and uses it for accountancy, auditabil-
ity, and time reference (e.g., time is defined as a difference in
block height in the chain).
Threshold Blind Signatures. Blind signatures are digital sig-
natures allowing users to hide (blind) the content of a message
from the signer. The user can then locally unblind the signa-
ture, which can then be publicly verified as traditional digital
signatures [16]. Most blind signature schemes entrust a single
authority with a master signing key, allowing a malicious
authority to forge any signature. To overcome this limitation,
PASTRAMI relies on threshold blind signatures [10] that
distribute the signing process between multiple authorities.
We give below the high-level definition of a threshold blind
signature scheme. For the sake of simplicity, we use in this
description a key generation algorithm BS.TTPKeyGen as
executed by a single trusted third party. This protocol can,
however, be executed in a distributed way as illustrated by
Gennaro et al. [26] under a synchrony assumption, and as
illustrated by Kate et al. [32] under a weak synchrony assump-
tion. All algorithms receive the security parameter λ as an
input but we show it explicitly only for Setup. Appendix A
provides the full cryptographic construction of the blind BLS
signature scheme.
❖ BS.Setup(1λ)→ (params): defines the system parame-
ters params with respect to the security parameter λ (these
parameters are publicly available).
❖ BS.TTPKeyGen(params, t ,n)→ (x ,y): run by the au-
thorities to generate a secret key x and a verification key y
from the public parameters params.
❖ BS.PrepareBlindSign(m)→ (h˜): run by the user to re-
quest a blind signature over the cryptographic material h˜
embedding the messagem.
❖ BS.BlindSign(xi , h˜)→ (σ˜i ): run by each authority i to
issue a partial blind signature σ˜i (using their private key xi )
over the user-provided cryptographic material h˜.
❖ BS.Unblind(r , σ˜i )→ (σi ): run by the user to unblind the
signature σ˜i and recover the signature σi (using the blinding
factor r ).
❖ BS.AggSig(σ1, . . . ,σt )→ (σ ): run by the user to aggre-
gate t partial signatures (σ1, . . . ,σt ) into a consolidated
signature σ .
❖ BS.Verify(y,m,σ )→ (true/false): run by any third party
verifier to check the validity of a signature σ over the mes-
sagem (using the aggregated public key y).
4.1 Multi-item Auction Execution
We consider a single smart contract that sets up an auction
for a set of I = {1, 2, ..., I } items. A set of B = {1, 2, ...,B}
bidders are interested into the offered items of the contract
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where each bidder b ∈ B is expressing their preference for
each item i ∈ I via a private monetary valuation, denoted
by vbi ≥ 0. We focus on a unit-demand setting where each
bidder is interested in acquiring at most a single item4. That
is, we consider a null item, denoted by 0, that is assigned to
the bidders who fail to acquire an item in the auction. Note
that the valuation of each bidder for the null item is zero, i.e.,
vb0 = 0 ∀b ∈ B. For notational convenience let I∗ = I ∪ {0}.
A feasible allocation X assigns an item xb ∈ I∗ to each
bidder b ∈ B such that for b , b ′ xb ∩ xb′ = ∅ or xb ∩
xb′ = 0, meaning that only the null item 0 can be allocated
to more than one bidder. A feasible allocation is consider
efficient, denoted by X ∗, if there is no allocation X such that∑
b ∈B vbxb >
∑
b ∈B vbx ∗b .
Auctions are pricing mechanisms that lead to a feasible
allocation of items. In detail, an auction associates each item
i ∈ I to a price pi forming the price vector p = (p0,p1, ....,pI ).
The seller of an item i can set a reservation price ri ≥ 0 that
is defined as the minimum price that it is willing to offer
the item for, restricting the auction’s assigned prices for the
specific item to pi ≥ ri . Given a price vector p, the interest
of each bidder is limited to the items that return the highest
valuation after reducing the corresponding price. That is, the
demand correspondence Db (p) for bidder b ∈ B is given by
Db (p) = {i ∈ I∗ : vbi − pi ≥ vbj − pj∀j ∈ I∗}.
A price vector p∗ is an equilibrium price vector if it derives
a feasible assignment X where an item i remains unassigned
at price p∗i = ri or it is uniquely assigned to a bidder b ∈ B,
i.e., xb = i and xb , xb′∀b ′ ∈ B\{b}, where xb ∈ Db (p)
at price p∗i ≥ ri . That is, the pair (X ,p∗) is an equilibrium
allocation if p∗ is an equilibrium price vector. The set of
competitive price vectors is non-empty and forms a complete
lattice [46], meaning that there is a unique minimal element
that is referred as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) price
vector and is denoted by pVCG. Furthermore, the correspond-
ing assignment to pVCG price vector is efficient, denoted by
XVCG.
This result essentially states that when the price vector
pVCG is applied, an item is assigned to a user at the lowest
possible price over any possible equilibrium price vector, i.e.,
any feasible assignment that respects bidders’ demand corre-
spondence. In other words, there is no other equilibrium than
VCG that bidders would prefer, since it satisfies their demand
in a stable way at the lowest possible price by deriving the
highest possible net valuations (i.e., the difference between
the bid and the obtained price). This has the implication that
under an auction that assigns items according to VCG equilib-
rium, bidders have no incentives to interfere with the smooth
operation of the mechanism; therefore is to the best of their
interest to be truthful upon the declaration of valuations for
each item of the auction.
4A bidder interested in buying multiple items may participate multiple times
to the same auction under different, un-linkable identities.
There are plenty of auction mechanisms that derive the
VCG equilibrium in polynomial time. We use the Multi-Item
Unit Demand Vickrey-Dutch Auction (VDA) [40, 41] as the
underlying auction of PASTRAMI5.
5 Preparation Phase
We present the protocol behind the preparation phase followed
by a formal description of the algorithms.
5.1 Preparation Phase Protocol
Setup. A set of authorities execute the Setup method of the
PASTRAMI smart contract; they provide their public keys
as well as any other scheme parameters (or policy) as the
number of authorities and the threshold parameter; publish
a unique identifier for the auction id, and initiate a timer T
(expressed in a number of blocks). Once created, any seller
can add a description of an item to be sold and a commitment
to a minimum price ri .
Commit. Bidders execute Commit by paying a deposit of
d coins to the PASTRAMI smart contract, and specifying
cryptographic material embedding a fresh account address
addr they own, the auction unique identifier id, a random
number k, and their bid b. The contract emits an event in-
structing the authorities to issue a blind signature using this
cryptographic material. The value d represents the number of
coins the bidder wishes to bid. To mitigate traffic analysis, d
should be limited to a specific set of possible values, similar
to cash denominations. Each authority monitors the PAS-
TRAMI smart contract, and issues a partial blind signature to
the user—either on chain or off-chain—upon detecting the re-
quest (signature requests are processed only if bidders paid a
deposit of d coins to the smart contract and correctly executed
Commit). Authorities use a different set of keys for each
cash denomination (e.g., if the user deposits d = 5, the au-
thorities issue the blind signature using a key pair (sk5,pk5)).
Bidders locally unblind and aggregate all partial signatures
into a consolidated signature. All account addresses in this
protocol must be fresh in order to not leak information about
the identity of the users; users can privately add coins to an
address using a coin tumbler [6, 12, 28, 38, 39, 45, 47, 51].
Reveal. After the timer expires, sellers open the commitment
to their minimum price. Bidders execute Reveal and submit
their unblinded signatures to the contract using their fresh
account address addr. The contract accepts the bid only if
it is submitted by the same address addr as the one embed-
ded in the signature, if the auction id matches the current
auction, and if it has not already seen the random number k;
the contract keeps track of all the numbers k it has seen thus
far to prevent double-spending. The contract interprets the
value associated with each signature based on their signing
5Alternative mechanisms include the Vickrey-English and Vickrey-English-
Dutch auctions which are also polynomial although are coming at a higher
complexity compared to VDA.
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key. Including addr in the blind signature and verifying that
it is used to submit the bid prevents malicious actors from
intercepting the bid during Reveal and spending it on behalf
of victim users.
5.2 Algorithms Construction
We present our algorithms. BS-prefixed algorithms are from
the threshold blind BLS signature scheme (Section 4).
Interactions between users and smart contract. We first
describe the algorithms allowing users to interact with the
PASTRAMI smart contract. We prefix bidders functions (ex-
ecuted off-chain by the client’s software) with a capital B,
and smart contract functions (executed on-chain by the PAS-
TRAMI smart contract) with a capital C. All algorithms have
implicitly access to the address identifying the account of the
bidder who sends the transaction. Symbol | | denotes string
concatenation.
❖ Setup(1λ)→ (params):
▷ Defines the system parameters params with respect to
the security parameter λ (these parameters are public).
Output BS.Setup(1λ); the smart contract creates an empty
spent-list L in memory, and initializes a timer T .
❖ Commit(d, addr, id,k,b,T )→ ():
▷ Can only be executed if the timerT is not expired; commit
to the bidb along with the parameters addr, id,k by sending
d coins to the contract.
❖ B.Commit(d, addr, id,k,b)→ (h˜):
Computem = (addr | |id | |k | |b),
and h˜ = BS.PrepareBlindSign(m); send h˜ along with
d coins to the appropriate smart contract instance.
❖C.Commit(h˜,T )→ (): if the timerT is not expired, emit
an event telling the authorities to issue a blind signature
to the bidder; otherwise ignore.
❖ Reveal(m,σ ,y,T )→ ():
▷ Reveal the bid by revealing the unblinded signature.
❖ B.Reveal(m,σ )→ (): submit (m,σ ) to the smart con-
tract using the address addr.
❖ C.Reveal(m,σ ,y) → (): parse m = (addr | |id | |k | |b);
save the bid b in memory if and only if the sender address
is addr, the auction id matches the current auction, k <
L, and if BS.Verify(y,m,σ ) = true; then append k to L.
Otherwise ignore.
Interactions between bidders and authorities. We describe
the algorithms allowing users to interact with the authorities.
We prefix off-chain bidders functions with a capital B, and
off-chain authority functions with a capital A.
❖ Issue(sk, h˜)→ (σ˜ ):
▷ The authorities issue a blind signature to the user over
the cryptographic material σ˜ .
❖ A.Issue(sk, h˜) → (σ˜i ): each authority returns to the
user (σ˜i ) = BS.BlindSign(sk, h˜).
❖ B.Issue(σ˜1, . . . , σ˜t )→ (σ ): for each σ˜i , compute σ˜ =
BS.AggCred(σ˜1, . . . , σ˜t ); output (σ ) = BS.Unblind(r , σ˜ ).
5.3 Expressing valuations
Regular are submitted as price vectors without any additional
support. To enable general bids, we enhance item descriptions
submitted by sellers by a set of characteristic C = {1, 2, ...,C}.
Each characteristic represents a single property of the submit-
ted item. In the example of FileCoin, these properties could be
the storage size, the service duration, or the seller reputation.
For simplicity, let all characteristics be expressed as integers.
A general bid uses a set of constraints for each charac-
teristic fb and a maximum budget db instead of a private
monetary valuation for each item vbi . Each bidder is inter-
ested uniquely in items fulfilling all the submitted constraints.
Furthermore, we use the constraint vector to automatically
derive private monetary valuations required by the auction
algorithm derive(fb ) = vbi (see Section 4.1).
The constraint vector of a general bid, while less flexible
than single item valuation allows to radically decrease the
amount of information submitted to blockchain and enhance
bidders’ privacy. Finally, the constraint vector is reusable and
can be submitted without knowing the list of offered items,
reducing further the overhead of our solution.
6 Execution Phase
At this time, all the information to determine an assignment
is available on the blockchain. This assignment is calculated
by the dedicated node. The first step is to derive bidders’ val-
uations from the general bids revealed in Reveal (Figure 3).
The derivation function assigns the specified maximum bud-
get v to all the items fulfilling the requirements vbi = v. If
at least one characteristic is lower than a specified constraint
the assigned valuation is set to 0, i.e., vbi = 0 Once valuation
vectors are computed, the dedicated node uses an unmodified
version of the Vickrey-Dutch auction algorithm [40, 41].
In order to incentivise correct behaviour, the dedicated
node must first provide a collateral ds . This collateral is re-
turned once the solution is marked as final. We calculate the
minimum amount of the deposit in Section 8.
A submitted solution consists of an assignment of items
to bidders X , a price vector p and a score s. p indicates the
established price of each item, while s represents the social
Submit 
items
Submit 
requirements
Reveal
Derive valuations and 
compute a solution
Timeout
Submit valid proof 
of misbehaviour
Solution accepted
Submit the solution
BLOCKCHAIN
Figure 3. The smart contract offloads heavy computations and accepts com-
puted solutions that can be contested by other users.
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welfare score (i.e., the sum of net valuations). By definition,
VCG equilibrium dictates the solution with the highest social
welfare, where all items are universally allocated (Section 4).
Once a solution is stored on-chain, bidders and sellers have
a predetermined amount of time t to verify it and submit a
proof of misbehaviour. If none is received after time t the
solution is marked as final.
6.1 Verification and Proofs of Misbehaviour
Given an assignment X , a price vector p and a score s, an
auction solution is correct if:
• every user is satisfied with their assigned item at a given
price, i.e., the solution is an equilibrium;
• no price is lower than the reservation price;
• the declared score is correct;
• every bidder pays for their assigned item the minimum
possible price over all possible equilibriums, which charac-
terises the VCG equilibrium.
Equilibrium misbehaviour. A user verifies whether the bid-
ders got assigned the most optimal items (with the highest
net valuation, i.e., bidder’s valuation after subtracting the
item’s price). Let the assigned item for a bidder b ∈ B be
xb = i. For each bidder we have to check if there is another
item ∃j ∈ I\{i} that the bidder would prefer at its current
price, i.e., vbi − pi < vbj − pj ; if it is the case, it is an in-
dication that the proposed assignment is not an equilibrium.
Users who detect the existence of such an item can submit a
proof of misbehaviour using the wrongAssignment smart
contract method, pointing out the bidder b and the alternative
item j associated to a higher net valuation. Upon reception
of this proof the smart contract derives bidder’s b current
net valuation, vbi − pi as well as the proposed alternative net
valuation vbj − pj before comparing the two. The entire op-
eration requires only 2 subtractions and a single comparison
and therefore its monetary cost is negligible, as we show in
Section 8.
Price misbehaviour. A user proceeds by verifying whether
items are offered at a valid price, i.e., greater than their reser-
vation price. If it is not the case, any user can point out an
index in p with a price lower than the reservation price using
the wrongPrice method. The whole operation requires just a
single comparison executed on the smart contract.
Score misbehaviour. Each candidate solution contains a score
s, corresponding to the sum of net valuations. Users checks
its validity in terms of
∑
b ∈B vbxb − pxb = s. This is done
by iterating through the assigned items and their price vector
while computing the sum of net valuations. If the score is
incorrect a user invokes wrongScore.
To verify the proof, the smart contract has to compute the
score on-chain, which may be expensive. However, the cost
for this calculation will reimbursed by the collateral submitted
by the dedicated node if the score was indeed incorrect.
VCG equilibrium misbehaviour. So far, we explained how
to verify that a candidate solution is an equilibrium, but not
that it is the VCG equilibrium. A VCG equilibrium is defined
as the one maximising the sum of bidders net valuations, i.e.,∑
b ∈B vbxb − pxb . Users compute a set of excess demand and
supply. This procedure consists of running a single iteration of
the Vickrey-Dutch algorithm and can be efficiently performed
in polynomial time (Figure 8). A non-empty set indicates
that the solution is not a VCG equilibrium with the highest
possible score and is thus incorrect.
Proofs submissions timescale. If no valid proof of misbe-
haviour is submitted by the deadline, the solution is marked
as final and the auction finishes. The majority of blockchain
platforms do not support scheduling invocation in the future.
However, it can be realised by a public function that checks
if enough time has passed before marking the solution as
final. The submitted solution indicates items assigned to each
bidder together with the price to pay that is lower than v. Bid-
ders that correctly followed the protocol but get no assigned
items may withdraw all of their deposited coins by calling
the Withdraw function of the PASTRAMI contract. Recall
that PASTRAMI applies a Vickrey-Dutch auction mecha-
nism [53]; the winner of the auction is the bidder with the
highest bid v, and pays the price of the second highest bid, v ′.
Bidders with assigned items are, therefore, able to call With-
draw to withdraw (v −v ′) coins. Bidders with assigned items
can now contact sellers and prove their identity by signing
any message using the private key used to participate in the
auction (see Section 5.1).
Misbehaviour example. Figure 4 presents an example of
an incorrect solution submitted to the smart contract for an
auction with 3 bidders and 3 items. The assignment X is
not an equilibrium. Net valuation (the difference between
the bid and the price) of Bidder 2 for its currently allocated
Item 2 equals to 0 and is lower than for Item 3 (net valuation
of 5). A valid proof of misbehaviour would point the user,
allocated Item 2 and alternative Item 3, allowing the smart
contract to calculate and compare both valuations efficiently.
Furthermore, the price (65) of Item 3 is incorrect as it is below
the reservation price specified by the seller (70). A valid proof
of misbehaviour simply points to the invalid price allowing
the smart contract to verify it against the reservation price
and the bid expressed by the assigned bidder. Finally, the
declared score is incorrect, as the sum of net evaluations is 45
(20 + 0 + 25).
7 Protocol Analysis and Discussion
We argue that PASTRAMI achieves the design goals de-
scribed in Section 2.
Auction’s economic properties. An auction satisfies all such
properties only under the condition of price-taker partici-
pants [42], i.e., both bidders and sellers have no impact on
bids expressed by other users. In the multi-item auctions we
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Item 2
Min.Size: 11 
Price: 60 
Item 3
Min.Size: 13
Price: 70 
Item 1
Min.Size: 9
Price: 30 
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wrongScore()
the actual score is 45
wrongPrice(3)
indicted price is below
items reserved price
Figure 4. An incorrect solution with different submitted proofs of misbe-
haviour.
consider, it has been proven that Vickrey auctions possesses
all these desired attributes based on the assumption of “sealed
bids”, where neither bidders nor sellers have information
about the state of the auction [53]. PASTRAMI through its
privacy properties provides a technical implementation of this
“sealed bids” assumption, and prevents price manipulations.
Our proofs of misbehaviours cover the full spectrum of
potential misbehaviours in terms of proposed solutions. wron-
gAssignment and wrongPrice limit a user to submit only
valid equilibrium solutions respecting minimum prices. That
is, the mechanism cannot be unfair to either a participating
bidder, who is happy with its assigned items at the given
price, or a seller, whose item can only be offered at more than
its reservation price. Given the ability to filter solutions that
are not fall into the valid equilibrium category, the involved
score-based system elicits the VCG equilibrium by allowing
anyone to submit the optimal solution with the highest score.
At the same time, an incorrect score can be contested using
wrongScore. In other words, in PASTRAMI the dedicated
node cannot exploit the mechanism by submitting an invalid
and/or unfair solution while it is incentivised to submit the
VCG equilibrium.
Correctness. PASTRAMI is implemented as a smart contract;
its correct execution can be verified by any third party, taking
advantage of the Public Auditability of the blockchain.
Bidders are bound to their bids as they are first required
to commit to their bid, and then to open the commitment
by unblinding the signature providing Bids binding. Bidders
cannot open the commitment to another value than the previ-
ously committed, as this would require forging the underlying
signature. The users commit to their bid during the commit
phase, thus they cannot modify it after observing the bids of
other users.
No single authority can issue a signature and steal all the
coins in the smart contract—the threshold property of the sig-
nature implies that adversaries need to corrupt an arbitrarily
large set of authorities for this attack to be possible. Bidders
cannot participate in the auction (Section 5) without paying
a deposit to receive a valid signature. The timer forces the
bidders to commit to their bid before revealing it, preventing
any third party from seeing other bidder’s bid before com-
mitting to a value. Bidders dropping out after committing a
bid (and never revealing it) are financially penalized as they
cannot withdraw their coins. Once issued, signatures can only
be used for the intended auction since they embedded an iden-
tifier id unique to this auction. As a result, users that do not
follow the protocol (i.e., first commit, and then reveal) lose
the associated coins, guaranteeing Fairness.
Privacy. Upon submission of item descriptions, sellers pro-
vide a commitment to their minimum prices instead of the
actual values. The minimum price is revealed only during the
reveal phase when no additional bids are accepted (Hidden
Minimum Price).
PASTRAMI takes advantage of the unlinkability property
of the underlying blind signature to break the link between
the commit and reveal phase, provided that bidders use fresh
addresses. As a result, bidders can submit bids on auctions
without revealing their identity enabling Bidders privacy.
Bids are kept private until the timer expires; the blindness
property of of the underlying signature scheme implies that
no information about the bid is revealed while committing to
a bid (Bids privacy).
Deployment. During the preparation phase (Section 5), Bid-
ders only interact with a subset of the the authorities; during
the execution phase (Section 6), they only interact with the
smart contract; during the execution phase, bidders only in-
teract with the sellers or with the smart contract to withdraw
their coins (Non-interactivity).
The decentralized nature of the blockchain makes the PAS-
TRAMI smart contract resilient to censorship and guarantees
Openness. Furthermore, a small subset of authorities cannot
block the issuance of blind signatures—the service is guaran-
teed to be available as long as at least a threshold number of
authorities are available.
PASTRAMI introduce no single trusted third party; the
PASTRAMI contract is executed on a decentralized smart con-
tract platform, and allows threshold issuance by Distributed
authorities.
PASTRAMI offloads the most CPU-intensive computation
to off-chain nodes, decreasing the operations performed on
the Smart Contract. The cost of almost all Smart Contract
methods is not influenced by increasing the number of items
and/or bidders. The only two exceptions consist of submit-
Solution and wrongScore. The former requires increased
on-chain storage when the number of participants increases.
However, this cost can be covered from a small commission
on system execution. The latter is invoked only when an in-
correct solution is proposed and its cost is completely covered
by the misbehaving node (Scalability). The off-chain solu-
tion calculation does not introduce any overhead compared
to the original and optimal version of the algorithm. Finally,
the verification done by users requires orders of magnitude
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lower calculation time than calculating the solution itself.
We provide an extensive evaluation of all the PASTRAMI
components in Section 8.
Extension to other types of auctions. PASTRAMI can be
easily extended to support both single-item and combinato-
rial auctions. Single-item auctions can be seen as a special
case of multi-item auctions (with one item only) and does
not require any further modifications. The main difference
between multi-item and combinatorial auctions lies in the
computations complexity. While it is possible to determin-
istically derive an optimal solution when using multi-item
auction, it has been shown that combinatorial auctions can
be modelled as the set packing problem, meaning that they
are NP-hard and there is no polynomial-time algorithm for
finding the optimal allocation [37]. However, PASTRAMI
does not perform auction assignment computations on-chain.
The score used could be computed in a similar way to our
current design, but with a different set of constraints. Sub-
mitting solutions to a combinatorial auction can be seen as
a proof of useful work, where better solutions replace those
with lower scores. Most of the changes are applied to the
off-chain component, to implement algorithms computing
assignments and verifying solutions submitted by others.
8 Implementation & Evaluation
We evaluate the PASTRAMI prototype on a desktop device
for the user side and Ethereum for the Smart Contract plat-
form, and compare it with an implementation of Verifiable
Sealed-bid Auction (VSA) [22]. VSA follow provides similar
auditability guarantees, follows a similar to ours approach run-
ning heavy computations off-chain, but supports only single-
item auctions6. We are not aware of any system providing
similar guarantees as ours, including privacy, for multi-item
auctions. Note that general, verifiable computation platforms
require validators to repeat the computations [29], do not pro-
vide sufficient privacy protection [49] or expierience multiple
orders of magnitude higher complexity [33]
Our implementation relies on threshold BLS signatures [10]
which are blinded using a construction introduced by Boldyreva [9].
This construction provides unlinkability between the signing
and verification process and preserves users’ anonymity. We
use a slightly modified version of the original blind BLS
signature of Boldyreva in order to make it compatible with
type-3 pairings, which are efficient [25] and supported by
Ethereum as pre-compiled contracts (for optimal Ate pairing
checks) on the elliptic curve alt_bn128 [14].
Setup. We deploy the PASTRAMI Smart Contract on the
Ethereum Ropsten Testnet. We implement the off-chain com-
ponent in Python 3 and connect it to the Smart Contract using
Web3.py [20]. The application listens for events generated on-
chain. It can automatically compute a solution after the reveal
6This section still evaluates a multi-item version of our system
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phase, or verify solutions submitted by others. All off-chain
computations are performed on a Dell Latitude 5590 laptop
with an Intel Core i7-8650U CPU and 16 GB of RAM.
The VSA [22] implementation uses two Ethereum Smart
Contracts and a client application written in C# [23].
Comparison with VSA. We start by investigating the cost
of deploying both platforms on Ethereum (Figure 5). Due
to much lower complexity and smaller contract size, PAS-
TRAMI incurs a 2.5 times lower deployment cost than VSA.
We continue by performing single-item auctions with in-
creasing number of users, as VSA only supports this type of
auctions. We measure the gas cost for each bidder (Figure 6
top). The PASTRAMI Smart Contract performs only a simple
set of operations, related to submitting and revealing bids.
It keeps the cost per user low and almost constant when the
number of participants increases. In contrast, VSA executes
the auction algorithm on-chain, resulting in much higher cost,
with a per-bidder costs that raises with the number of bidders.
Finally, we compare the execution time of the off-chain
components for all the users and the node calculating solution
in PASTRAMI (Figure 6 bottom). Even though PASTRAMI
needs to calculate an assignment off-chain, the required opera-
tions are much simpler than the costly zero-knowledge proofs
used by VSA. It results in much lower computational load
and much lower impact of an increasing number of users.
Smart Contract Evaluation. We investigate the cost of in-
voking each function of the PASTRAMI Smart Contract on
Ethereum. We use Remix [21] to calculate this cost in gas and
ETH Gast Station [18] to convert it to ETH and to an indica-
tive amount in USD7. For the conversion, we use Ethereum
Slow mode which increases confirmation time, but decreases
monetary cost of all the operations. Table 2 presents the re-
sults. We split the number into fixed part (not influenced by
the number of bidders/items) and dynamic part expressed as
an additional cost per item/bidder. For simplicity, we assume
the same number of bidder and items participating in the auc-
tion. The presented cost includes both the transaction and the
execution cost.
7Measured on November 30th 2019.
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Operation Gas USD
Commit 26,590 0.15
Reveal 364,456 2.06
submitItem 43,556 0.3
RevealMinPrice 52,378 0.361
submitSolution 5,068 + 408* 0.155 + 0.003*
wrongAssign-
ment 45,572 0.282
wrongScore 18,048 +6,494* 0.112 + 0.04*
wrongPrice 35,714 0.221
Table 2. Cost of invoking PASTRAMI functions. *per bidder/item
The Commit algorithm is cheap as it only performs ba-
sic checks and emits an event asking the authorities to issue
a blind signature to the user; our implementation assumes
the signature issuance happens off-chain. The Reveal algo-
rithm is more expensive as it performs a signature verification,
involving elliptic curve pairing checks. The analogical algo-
rithms for submitting and revealing item description involves
only simple commitments and much lower monetary cost.
Submitting a solution with submitSolution consists only
of storing the solution on-chain. This involves a small static
cost and small cost per item for the storage space. wron-
gAssignment and wrongPrice use indexes passed as input
parameters and perform only simple mathematical operations
(comparison and subtractions). Finally, wrongScore requires
iterating through the assignment and re-calculating the score
in order to verify whether the declared score is correct. The
minimum collateral submitted by the dedicated node should
be greater than the cost of the most expensive method being
part of the proofs of misbehaviour. PASTRAMI automatically
computes this value based on information from Table 2 and
the size of the auction and does not accept solutions with
lower collateral.
Filecoin deployment. As an example of the use of auctions
in a decentralised utility platform, we extract data about stor-
age nodes from the Filecoin testnet [4, 5]. At the core of
Filecoin lies a Storage Market that acts as an exchange point
where clients and miners can advertise their requests and of-
fer storage space. Currently, Filecoin maintains an on-chain
order book storing a public list of active storage miner offers
and client orders. It rely on a direct, peer-to-peer off-chain
assignment between users and storage providers. Once two
parties reach an agreement, they upload a signed deal to the
blockchain.
We query the Filecoin network for all the miners offering
storage together with their features. With the current API,
we were able to get the current storage price per GB and
storage duration, but the available storage capacity is currently
unavailable [44].
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We perform multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions using dif-
ferent numbers of bidders. We convert Filecoin prices to USD
per GB per month. The bids are derived from the Google
Cloud Storage price [48] and randomized storage duration
such that bidders willing to rent storage space for longer pay
a lower price per month.
Figure 7 presents the evaluation of average price and aver-
age net valuation in USD. Dotted lines indicate simpler mech-
anisms where bidders manually contact advertised workers
and agree to pay reservation price, valuation price or value
in between. We observe that the auction algorithm is able to
adapt to changes in the supply/demand ratio and derive the
most optimal prices. When the number of bidders exceeds
the number of items, the price raises to the average valuation
and does not increase further, as we assume that at this point,
users will switch to cloud storage providers.
Finally, we measure the time required to calculate a solu-
tion and verify it with increasing number of users (Figure 8).
Even for 10,000 users, PASTRAMI is able to derive an op-
timal solution in less than 8s. Furthermore, the verification
process proves to be efficient and completes within 500ms
even for the largest auction.
9 Related Work
We cover related work on private computation over blockchains,
auction platforms, and decentralised cloud platforms. We sum-
marize the most related solutions and their security features
in Table 3.
Several frameworks aim at hiding private data submitted
to a public ledger. Hawk [33] divides Smart Contracts into
public and private parts and secure private input using zero-
knowledge proofs, but requires a centralized trusted manager
to operate. ShadowEth [55] allows processing confidential
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System Bids Privacy Bidders Privacy Bidders Non-Interactivity Distributed Authority Trusted Hardware Public Auditability
ShadowEth [55] ✓ ✗ ✓ Intel SGX [19] ✓
Hawk [33] ✓ ✗ ✓ None ✓
Strain [7] ✓ ✗ ✗ None ✓
Galal et al. [24] ✓ ✗ ✗ None ✓
Bogetoft et al. [8] ✓ ✗ ✓ None ✗
Filecoin [34] ✗ ✗ ✗ None ✓
Galal et al. [22] ✓ ✗ ✓ None ✓
PASTRAMI ✓ ✓ ✓ None ✓
Table 3. Comparison of properties achieved by related systems. The decentralisation property reads as follows; : relies on a trusted third party,
: relies on a trusted third party for only one (or some) of the properties described in Section 2, : does not rely on any trusted third party.
Smart Contract data using Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE). However, such a scheme requires users to trust the
hardware vendor and can expose the system to TEE’s vulner-
abilities [17, 52, 54].
Blass and Kerschbaum [7] propose Strain, a system that
preserves sealed-bid auctions privacy against malicious par-
ticipants. Strain uses a two-party comparison protocol based
on Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC), but has a flaw
that reveals the order of bids. Furthermore, running protocols
involving MPC on blockchain is not efficient due to the exten-
sive computations and the number of rounds involved. Galal
and Youssef [22] present a protocol ensuring public verifiabil-
ity, privacy of bids, and fairness. However, the solution scales
badly with the number of bidders and relies on random num-
ber retrieved from blockchains that are not proven to be secure.
This scheme was later improved using zk-SNARKS [24], but
it still relies on a centralized party for zero-knowledge proofs
and does not protect bidders’ identities. An alternative ap-
proach was proposed by Bogetoft et al. [8]. Their system uses
MPC to perform auctions on encrypted bids. However, such
a scheme reveals the final assignment between bidders and
items and does not provide transparency.
Filecoin [34] does not implement an automated system
assigning clients to storage nodes. Users are required to chose
storage nodes on a one-to-one basis and offers are publicly
posted on the blockchain. Other industrial system such as
Golem [50], iExec [1] or SONM [2] either do not specify
their requester—worker assignment technique or rely on sim-
ilar, non-transparent solutions. All those platform could use
PASTRAMI to increase their level of security and automati-
cally determine optimal price for services.
10 Conclusion
We presented PASTRAMI, a system for determining an as-
signment between providers and users and deriving optimal
prices in a decentralised environment, while preserving the
privacy and accountability of participants.
PASTRAMI enables a transparent use of Vickey-Dutch
multi-item auctions to derive prices, assignments and max-
imise social wellness. It secures users bids as well as the
identity of the bidders using blind signatures. In contrast with
previous work, PASTRAMI does not rely on a trusted third
party to issue signatures, but rather on a set of entities that can
be freely chosen by users. These distributed authorities issue
only partial signatures that are merged locally by each users,
protecting the system from a subset of malicious authorities.
To enable scalability, heavy computations are performed
off-chain and submitted to a smart contract. An assignment
for an auction can be challenged by proofs of misbehaviour
submitted by users to this smart contract. We have shown
how PASTRAMI can be deployed on Ethereum blockchain
and adapted to shared economy systems with the example of
Filecoin, and our evaluation shows its reduced costs compared
to a system with similar auditability guarantees.
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A Blind BLS signatures
We recall the cryptographic construction of the blind BLS
signature [9] used in our implementation. For the sake of
simplicity, we describe below a key generation algorithm
BS.TTPKeyGen as executed by a trusted third party; this
protocol can however be executed in a distributed way as illus-
trated by Gennaro et al. [26] under a synchrony assumption,
and as illustrated by Kate et al. [32] under a weak synchrony
assumption.
❖ BS.Setup(1λ)→ (params): Choose a bilinear group
(G1,G2,GT )with orderp, wherep is an λ-bit prime number.
Let д1 be a generator of G1, and д2 a generator of G2. The
system parameters are params = (G1,G2,GT ,p,д1,д2).
❖ BS.TTPKeyGen(params, t ,n)→ (x ,y): Pick a polyno-
mial v of degree t − 1 with coefficients in Fp , and set
(x ,y) = (v(0),дv(0)2 ). Issue to each authority i ∈ [1, . . . ,n]
a secret key xi = v(i), and publish their verification key
yi = д
xi
2 .
❖ BS.PrepareBlindSign(m)→ (h˜): pick a random r ←
F; output h˜ = H ∗(m)r ∈ G1.
❖ BS.BlindSign(xi , h˜)→ (σ˜i ): output σ˜i = h˜xi .
❖ BS.Unblind(r , σ˜ )→ (σ ): output σ = σ˜ (−r ).
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❖ BS.AggSig(σ1, . . . ,σt )→ (σ ): Output σ = ∏ti=1 σ lii ),
where l is the Lagrange coefficient:
li =
[
t∏
j=1, j,i
(0 − j)
] [
t∏
j=1, j,i
(i − j)
]−1
mod
❖ BS.Verify(y,m,σ )→ (true/false): compute h = H ∗(m);
output true if e(h,y) = e(σ ,д2); otherwise output false.
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